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Abstract 
Introducing monetary fines to decrease an undesired behavior can sometimes have the 
counterintuitive effect of increasing the prevalence of the behavior being targeted. Such findings 
raise important social psychological questions in relation to both the way in which financial 
penalties are framed and the social contexts in which they are administered. In a field experiment 
(Study 1), we informed participants who had signed up for an experiment that they would be 
fined if they arrived late. This fine was presented as either compensatory or retributive in nature 
and as being administered either privately or publicly. We then observed participants’ 
subsequent arrival time. In accordance with our hypotheses, participants’ punctuality was only 
improved (relative to a no-fine control) in response to retributive rather than compensatory fines 
and when told that fines would be administered publicly rather than privately. In Study 2 we 
used a scenario method to demonstrate that the greater efficacy of retributively framed fines can 
be attributed to their presence being less likely to undermine the perceived immorality of 
transgression than is the case for compensatory fines. We propose a material promotion-moral 
prevention (MPMP) theory to account for our findings and consider its practical implications for 
the use of financial disincentives to encourage cooperative behavior through public policy in 
domains such as climate change.  
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versions of this paper.
  
 3 
A fine is a more effective financial deterrent when framed retributively and extracted 
publicly 
Fines are a part of everyday life. Policy makers routinely employ financial penalties and other 
deterrents to discourage undesirable actions (such as speeding, littering, or tax evasion) under the 
assumption that the association of behavior with a punishment will render the targeted behavior 
less attractive (Becker, 1968; Cooter, 1998). Beginning with Skinner (1945) and Thorndike’s 
(1913) seminal work on operant conditioning, a wealth of experimental evidence has 
accumulated demonstrating that punishments can successfully decrease undesired behavior 
(Benabou & Tirole 2006; Eek, Loukopoulos, Fujii, & Gärling, 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
McCusker & Carnevale, 1995; Ostrom, Walker & Gardner, 1992; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999; 
Wit & Wilke, 1990; Yamagishi, 1986). However, as was famously highlighted by Gneezy and 
Rustichini’s (2000) now widely-cited field experiment, introducing fines can sometimes produce 
counterintuitive effects. In their experiment, they had a group of day care centers in an Israeli 
city impose a fine on parents every time they picked up their child late. Startlingly, the centers 
that introduced this fine actually experienced a subsequent increase in the number of parents 
arriving late relative to those who introduced no such fine. Similar findings have also been 
obtained in other field contexts as well as in the social psychological laboratory (Benabou & 
Tirole, 2003; Fehr & Falk, 2002; Holmås, Kjerstad, Lurås & Straume, 2010; Mulder, van Dijk, 
De Cremer & Wilke, 2006).  
The theoretical account provided by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) for this highly 
counter-intuitive finding was that parents simply viewed the fine as a ‘price’ paid to perform a 
desirable and convenient behavior (arriving later) rather than as a punishment for wrong-doing. 
Along similar lines, but from a more social psychological perspective, Mulder (2008; 2009) has 
  
 4 
suggested that psychological and behavioral responses to deterrents may be strongly determined 
by whether the deterrent in question is perceived as retributive or compensatory in nature. 
Deterrents are perceived to be compensatory when they are seen as a means by which one 
compensates (‘pays’) for the negative consequences of one’s transgression (e.g., required 
overtime pay for childcare staff). On the other hand, they are perceived to be retributive when 
they are seen as a means by which one is punished because one has transgressed a moral norm, 
such as the norm to avoid inconveniencing others (also see Darley & Pittman, 2003). As Mulder 
(2009) notes, it is only when a deterrent is interpreted as retributive that it is likely to frame the 
undesired behavior in terms of shared moral standards. Thus, she suggests, the threat of 
retributive punishment is more likely to produce the desired effect on behavior, particularly if the 
material cost of the fine is not especially high. When the deterrent is interpreted in a more 
compensatory way, however, a social actor is more likely to see fines as simply providing an 
opportunity to compensate the victims of the social actor’s behavioral choice (e.g., the child care 
workers), thereby actually making transgression seem (paradoxically) more attractive under such 
a system. 
Studies examining the more general effects of situational construal on economic behavior 
have suggested that the extent to which a decision-making context is framed in moral terms can 
have a marked impact on the decisions that people make. For example, Lieberman, Samuels and 
Ross (2004) showed that simply introducing a Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm to participants as 
‘The Community Game’ generated twice as much cooperation than when it was introduced as 
‘The Wall Street Game’. Although these findings demonstrate the potential impact of different 
‘mindset’ frames on decisions within the context of social traps, they do not directly address the 
capacity for such effects to be elicited in the context of implementing different forms of 
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sanctions. The empirical work that comes closest to such an insight is that of Tenbrunsel and 
Messick (1999), in which business students imagined themselves in a hypothetical scenario 
whereby they were a company production manager tasked with making a decision that was 
conceptually akin to a two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma. Participants were told that they should 
make their hypothetical decisions regarding whether to cooperate or defect in light of either a) an 
inspection/sanction regime with low probability of detecting defection and a relatively 
inconsequential fine for defection (weak sanction), b) a regime that had high detection 
probability and a substantial fine (strong sanction) or c) no inspection regime. The findings 
showed that although cooperation rates were highest under strong sanctions, levels of 
cooperation under weak sanctions were actually lower than when no sanction was present. 
Tenbrunsel and Messick (1999) suggest that sanctions led to participants adopting a ‘business’ 
frame rather than an ‘ethical’ decision frame – a claim supported by the recorded post-hoc self-
reports of participants, in which those in both sanction conditions were more likely to report 
having adopted a ‘business’ frame relative to those participants in the no-sanction condition.  
Tenbrunsel and Messick’s (1999) findings therefore speak to the possibility of different 
mindsets being invoked by sanctions of different magnitude (also see Mulder, Verboon & 
DeCremer, 2009) and/or differing levels of detection probability. The primary implication of 
Tenbrunsel and Messick’s model is that if an authority is going to fine at all, then they must fine 
big or risk undermining cooperation via the removal of a moral motive. However there are many 
situations in which the implementation of harsh sanctions is not politically palatable for an 
authority, especially in response to less serious incursions. As a result, what becomes both 
theoretically and practically crucial is developing an understanding of whether exactly the same 
type or strength of sanction can lead to greatly different levels of co-operation simply by virtue 
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of it being framed in ways that invoke different mindsets or interpretations of the social meaning 
of the sanction.  The theoretical distinction drawn by various authors between retributive and 
compensatory frames in terms of the levels of morality that they convey regarding the target 
behavior (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Mulder, 2009) offers one such potential theoretical 
handle. However, as yet, there is no direct empirical evidence to support this model. The current 
studies aim to provide such evidence. 
We also seek in the current work to address a second, previously overlooked, social 
aspect of Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) methodology — the public or private administration of 
fines. Specifically, the notice that was posted on the day care center bulletin boards to 
communicate the fine’s introduction to parents included the following statement: “The fine will 
be calculated monthly, and it is to be paid together with the regular monthly payment” (Gneezy 
& Rustichini, 2000, p. 27). The strictly private nature of this transaction thus meant the payment 
of lateness fines did not involve late-coming parents having to face (or anticipate facing) the 
individuals they had inconvenienced (i.e., the day care workers).  
The legal literature is replete with theoretical and philosophical debate regarding the 
potential efficacy and ethics of the use of public sanctions in the criminal justice system (for 
examples, see Flanders, 2006; Kahan, 1996; Massaro, 1997; Shemtob, 2013; Whitman, 1998). 
However this discussion has been predominantly focused on the more extreme end of the 
spectrum in terms of both the behaviors in question and the sanctions imposed (i.e. public 
shaming as an alternative to prison for criminal offences). By contrast, our focus here lies in 
empirically examining the potential for the threat of more mild forms of social pressure or 
disapproval (what Massaro (1997) might instead define as ‘guilt’-inducing) to increase pro-social 
behavior. Moreover, as Flanders (2006) points out, one of the potential problems with using fines 
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as a deterrent is their potential ‘fail[ure]…along the expressive dimension’, suggesting that fines 
convey ‘the message that crime is merely costly behavior, rather than something that society 
unequivocally condemns’ (p.614). Public sanctions have thus usually been suggested as an 
alternative, more value-expressive, response to crime that has the additional benefit of also 
causing less harm to offenders and being less costly than imprisonment. However one might 
question whether public sanctions need necessarily be thought of only as a more value-
expressive alternative to financial deterrents when the possibility also exists to give financial 
deterrents themselves a more public flavor.  
There is, as yet, relatively little direct experimental evidence for the efficacy of publicly 
extracted financial deterrents. Xiao and Houser (2011) have demonstrated in a laboratory context 
that the public implementation of weak financial disincentives in public goods games are more 
effective in increasing cooperation than the same disincentives implemented privately. 
Consequently, it is possible that Gneezy and Rustichini’s (2000) field results may have also 
resulted, in part, from the private nature with which the imposed fine was advertised as being 
extracted. However direct evidence for such effects in field settings is currently lacking. In the 
current work we empirically explore whether the potential value-expressive failures of financial 
deterrents might be overcome, at least in the context of encouraging more pro-social behavior, by 
making the process of their extraction more public in nature.  
The current studies 
We investigated across two studies whether the amount of behavioral change produced 
by materially identical financial deterrents can depend upon how such fines are framed and 
administered, and also the psychological mechanisms by which such effects might be produced. 
In our first study we conducted a field experiment that investigated the effects on real, observed 
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behavior of fines framed as either retribution or compensation that were expected to be 
administered either publicly or privately.  In our second study we employed a scenario 
methodology to explore whether, as we suggest above, the effects of fine framing on behavior 
might be driven by the differing levels of morality ascribed to a behavior when fine 
announcements are worded in either retributive or compensatory ways.  
Study 1 
To empirically test the effects on behavior of the compensatory versus retributive framing 
and public versus private extraction of fines, our first study involved a field experiment in which 
we measured individuals’ punctuality in response to the threat of a fine imposed for late arrival at 
an experiment. We hypothesized that individuals would be more punctual in their arrival when 
the fine was framed as retribution (rather than compensation) and when participants believed that 
the deterrent would be administered publicly (rather than privately).  
Method 
Participants and Design. Participants were 205 undergraduate students at the University of 
Exeter who were randomly allocated to one of six conditions within a 2 x 2 experimental design 
in which Frame (compensatory vs. retributive) and Context (public vs. private) of fine were both 
manipulated between participants.  In addition, we included two no-fine control groups1 (one 
using retributive wording and one using compensatory wording – as outlined below). Of those 
who initially signed up to participate, 57 (28%) failed to attend their session, leaving a total 
sample of 148, 96 of whom were female, with a mean age of 20.27 years (SD = 2.67). The 
number of no-shows did not differ across compensatory and retributive fine frames, c2(1, N = 
125) = .01, p =.92, or private and public contexts of fine administration, c2(1, N = 125) = 1.30, p 
= .25. Rates of no-show also did not differ between those in the conditions involving a fine and 
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those in the no fine control, c2(1, N = 204) = .95, p =.33. Participants received £5 (~7.75 USD), 
on average, for their involvement in the experiment.  
Materials and Procedure. An initial recruitment email was sent to a number of undergraduate 
student research participation lists advertising that participants were sought for an ‘economic 
psychology game’ study that would take approximately 30 minutes and inviting those interested 
to sign up online. Would-be participants were also informed that they would be remunerated 
with a £2 attendance fee for showing up and would be given the opportunity to earn up to an 
additional £6 (£3 on average) during the study, dependent upon decisions made in the 
experimental game by both themselves and the other participants in their session.  
All sessions presented to participants started at 9am on weekdays (with day of session 
being counter-balanced across experimental conditions). Upon signing up for their choice of 
session, participants received an email confirmation. This email highlighted the importance of 
arriving in time for the start of the session at 9am and stipulated, for those in the fine conditions, 
that participants who were more than 15 minutes late would be fined their £2 attendance fee as a 
result. The reason for this fine was manipulated to be either compensatory or retributive within 
the text of the email. Those in the compensatory fine condition were informed that “lab space is 
in high demand in the department at this time of year” and thus it was important that participants 
arrive on time because “arriving late may hamper our ability to complete the session, which will 
have financial implications for the research project” and that “as a means to compensate for this, 
latecomers will forfeit their £2 show up fee if more than 15 mins late”. This constructed the fine 
as partly offsetting the negative implications of participants’ wrongdoing. Those in the 
retributive fine condition were informed that it was important that they arrive on time simply 
because “latecomers will cause large inconveniences” and that ‘for this reason, latecomers will 
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forfeit their £2 show up fee if more than 15 mins late’. This version of the email thus highlighted 
why late attendance was ‘wrong’ - with the fine being justified solely in terms of it being 
reflective of the wrongness of arriving late.  
To test for the possibility that differences in the wording of these two frames (other than 
just the ability of the fine to compensate for wrong-doing) might affect participants’ perceptions 
of the seriousness of late coming, we pilot tested the email wordings on a sample of 
undergraduate students from the same university. These 60 participants (32 female, Mage = 21.17, 
SDage = 3.60) were approached on campus and told that we were looking for students to 
participate in a short study to help us decide how best to communicate the importance of turning 
up on time to experiments in our lab. Participants who agreed to participate were provided with a 
screen shot of either the email sent to participants in the compensatory condition or the email 
sent to those in the retributive condition, but without the actual possibility of a fine being 
mentioned in either email. Thus, those in the retributive pilot condition simply read that it was 
important that they arrive on time because latecomers will cause large inconveniences, whereas 
those in the compensatory pilot condition simply read that that lab space is in high demand in the 
department at this time of year and thus it was important that participants arrive on time because 
arriving late may hamper our ability to complete the session, which will have financial 
implications for the research project. Removing the actual fine from the email allowed us to pilot 
test whether basic differences in the wording of the two emails might be responsible for different 
perceptions of the importance of arriving on time, as opposed to the specific framing of the fine 
itself as compensatory or retributive.  Participants in both conditions were then asked to rate their 
level of agreement on a 7-point Likert scale with 3 items ( = .72) measuring the level of harm 
they felt would be caused by coming late to such an experiment (e.g., ‘If I arrived late to this 
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experiment it would result in negative consequences for others’; ‘It wouldn’t be a major problem 
if I arrived late to this experiment’ [reversed]).  
Results of this pilot indicated no significant difference in perceived harm caused between 
retributive and compensatory wordings (t (58) = 1.56, p = .12), and in fact showed that the harm 
caused by lateness was, if anything, perceived to be higher in the compensatory wording 
condition (M = 5.66, SD =1.02) than in the retributive wording condition (M = 5.21, SE =1.23). 
Thus, we can be reasonably confident that any superior punctuality by those in the retributive 
fine condition cannot simply be attributed to higher perceptions of the seriousness of lateness 
driven by basic differences in the wording of the two emails. 
The social context of the fine’s administration was also manipulated within this same 
email. Those in the private fine condition were told that “Late fines will be privately deducted 
from participants' payments”, whereas those in the public condition were told that “Due to the 
nature of the experiment, late fines will be publicly deducted from participants' payment in front 
of other players”.  
For participants in the no fine control condition, half received an email with exactly the 
same retributive wording outlined above regarding the importance of being on time, except that 
there was no possibility of a fine mentioned. The other half of the control participants received 
the same wording as those in the compensatory condition, except that there was again no 
mention of a possible fine.  
Participants in all conditions were requested to reply to the email they received to confirm 
that they had read and understood the message. All participants complied with this request. In 
order to maximize the salience of the manipulations prior to arrival at the experiment, a final 
reminder email was sent to participants 24 hours before their scheduled session, which repeated 
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this same manipulation of the independent variables. This also had the benefit of reducing 
potential noise in the data produced by any small and randomly distributed differences across 
participants in the time lag between the initial confirmatory email and the date of their particular 
session. 
The exact amount of time before or after 9am that each participant arrived at the 
experimental session was recorded to the nearest 10 seconds. No participants in the fine 
conditions arrived after 9.15am, removing the need to actually fine any participants their 
attendance fee. After arrival, participants took part in an economic psychology game (the 
specific procedure of which is not outlined here because it constitutes a separate study). Upon 
completion of the game, participants were given their monetary reward, which depended on their 
performance in the game in addition to their £2 attendance fee. Participants were thanked for 
their contribution and fully debriefed regarding the study’s aims. 
Results 
Across the sample of participants who showed up to the study, 34% arrived after the requested 
time of 9am, with a mean arrival time overall of 1.64 minutes before 9am (SD = 4.77). Due to 
there being no significant differences between the two no-fine control conditions in either 
number of participants arriving after 9am, c2(1, N = 54) = .78, p =.38, or mean arrival time, 
F(1,53) = .29, p = .64), these two conditions were collapsed into one single no fine control 
condition2.  
To assess our hypotheses we first tested if the dichotomous measure of whether 
participants arrived before or after the requested time was affected by the framing of the message 
and the social context in which the fine would be (putatively) administered. As shown in Figure 
1, and in support of our hypothesis, participants were half as likely to arrive late in the retributive 
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fine condition (20%) compared to both the compensatory fine condition (40%, Fisher’s exact test 
(1, N=93), p = .02), and the no fine control (41%, Fisher’s exact test (1, N=100), p = .02). 
Furthermore, participants were also almost half as likely to arrive late in the public condition 
(21%) than they were in either the private condition (39%, Fisher’s exact test (1, N= 93), p = 
.049), or the no fine control (41%, Fisher’s exact test (1, N=101, p = .03). The cumulative effect 
of these two independent variables represented the difference between only 9% of participants in 
the public-retributive condition transgressing and arriving late compared to 48% of participants 
arriving late in the private-compensatory condition (see Table 1). 
We also conducted a two-way ANOVA3 to test whether framing and context of 
administration affected participants’ exact arrival time, given that arriving well before the start 
time represents a different behavioral response to a participant taking the risk of being late by 
choosing to arrive just before 9am. Moreover, arriving substantially late is clearly quite a 
different response to arriving only a matter of seconds late. As shown in Figure 1, and in 
accordance with our initial hypotheses, we observed a significant main effect of frame, F(1,143) 
= 3.79, p = .05, η2 = .03, with pairwise comparisons indicating that arrival times for those in the 
retributive condition (M = 2.95 minutes before 9am, SD = 4.24) were significantly earlier (p = 
.04) than those in the no fine control (M = .99 minutes before 9am, SD = 5.33) and also  
marginally significantly earlier (p = .056) than those in the compensatory condition (M = 1.08 
minutes before 9am, SD = 4.37). There was no significant difference between compensatory and 
control conditions (p = .91).  
Similarly, we observed a significant main effect of context of administration, F(1,143) = 
6.96, p = .01, η2 = .05), with pairwise comparisons again revealing that those in the public 
condition arriving significantly earlier (M = 3.28 minutes before 9am, SD = 3.68) than those in 
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both the private condition (M = 0.75 minutes before 9am, SD = 471, p = .01) and those in the no 
fine condition (M = 0.99 minutes before 9am, SD = 5.33, p = .02). There was no significant 
difference in arrival time between the private condition and the no fine control (p = .79). There 
was also no significant interaction between fine frame and context of fine administration on 
exact arrival time (F(1,143) = 0.40, p = .53). However, again, the cumulative effect of these two 
independent variables represented the difference between participants arriving over 4.5 minutes 
early (on average) in the public-retributive condition compared to arriving (on average) only 6 
seconds before the agreed start time in the private-compensatory condition (see Table 2). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide empirical evidence to support the theoretical claim made in past 
literature (e.g., Fehr & Falk 2002; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Mulder, 2009) regarding the 
potential for financial deterrents to be ineffectual when framed and interpreted in a 
compensatory, rather than retributive, fashion. The study also provides field evidence for the 
greater behavioral effect of fines threatened to be extracted publicly, rather than privately. 
However a key element of the theoretical model that we outlined in our introduction was that 
retributively framed fines should be more effective because they are more likely to lead people 
to conceive the undesired behavior in terms of shared moral standards. Our second study set out 
to provide empirical evidence for this proposed psychological process mechanism.   
The typical way to demonstrate that a particular psychological process is driving the 
effect of a manipulation on a behavioral outcome measure is to measure that process as a 
mediator variable within the behavioral study itself. This was not an option in the context of the 
current field paradigm, however, due to our behavioral measure (arrival time at the session) 
having to be performed by participants prior to us having an opportunity to measure anything 
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else (such as morally wrong lateness was seen to be it was to be). As a result, any extent to which 
a participant’s measured perceived immorality of late arrival might correlate with their own 
actual arrival time would risk being completely confounded by potential cognitive dissonance 
effects (Festinger, 1957). In essence, if a participant had just arrived very late to our study and 
we then asked them how immoral it is to arrive late, cognitive dissonance theory tells us that this 
participant would be motivated to reduce their state of cognitive dissonance by deciding that it is 
not so bad after all to be late. Obviously, the opposite would potentially be true for participants 
who had arrived early. Thus, any observed ‘mediation’ within such a paradigm would be 
theoretically muddy at best and completely spurious at worst. As a result, in our second study we 
developed a slightly less direct way to demonstrate that the differential effects of retributive and 
compensatory framings of financial deterrents might be driven by their relative abilities to 
construe the targeted behavior in moral terms. 
Study 2 
In this study, participants read a scenario about another student research participant, Robin, who 
had turned up late to a study for which he had been told late attendance would result in a similar 
fine to those threatened to our real participants in Study 1, with this fine again being framed in 
either a retributive or compensatory way. We subsequently measured the extent to which 
participants who read this scenario perceived the target individual’s lateness to constitute a moral 
transgression. We hypothesized that the target’s lateness would be seen as less of a moral 
transgression when performed in response to a fine with a compensatory frame relative to when 
the fine was retributively framed.  
Method 
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Participants and Design. Participants were 90 undergraduate students at the University of 
Exeter who were randomly allocated to one of three conditions: a retributive fine, a 
compensatory fine or a no fine control. Of these 90 participants, half (45) were female. The mean 
age of participants was 20.67 years old (SD = 2.62) and 75% identified their ethnicity as ‘White 
British’.    
Materials and Procedure.  Participants were approached on campus by a research assistant who 
asked if they would be willing to complete a very short survey study examining ‘how people 
perceived the conduct of others’. Those who agreed to participate were then asked to read a 
written scenario about another undergraduate student (‘Robin’) from the same university. It was 
explained that Robin had signed up to participate in an experiment in the psychology department 
that would involve him and a group of other students arriving at the lab at the same time to play 
an economic decision making task.  
It was then explained that, upon signing up for the study, Robin had been sent an email 
by the researcher running the study (‘Jason Bell’) providing more details regarding Robin’s 
participation. Below this explanatory text was inserted a screen shot of an email from Jason Bell 
to Robin, which appeared (visually) just as it would in a standard Outlook email platform. 
Participants in the retributive condition were presented with exactly the same email that was 
received by participants in the retributive condition of our field experiment (Study 1) and those 
in the compensatory condition viewed the same email as that received by those in the 
compensatory condition of the field experiment. For those in control condition, half received the 
email from the no fine control in the field experiment that used the retributive wording but with 
no mention of a fine and half received the equivalent no fine control email from the field 
experiment that used the compensatory wording but with no mention of a fine. These were 
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combined into a singular no fine control condition (as was the case in the field experiment). 
Underneath the screen shot of the email it was explained (in text) that, two days after receiving 
the email in question, Robin turn up late for the group experiment.  
 Having read this scenario, participants were then asked to answer a series of questions 
about ‘their perception of Robin’s conduct’. This involved a 5-item scale ( = .78), which we 
used to measure the extent to which they perceived Robin’s lateness to represent a moral 
transgression (e.g., “It was morally irresponsible of Robin to arrive late”; “Robin’s lateness 
seemed very socially irresponsible to me”; “I wouldn’t judge Robin for being late”[reversed]). 
Participants indicated their level of agreement with each statement on a 7-point scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
In addition, we also presented participants with 3 items ( = .81) measuring the extent to 
which they thought that late arrival to the experiment in question would have been common (i.e. 
normative) among all the students who signed up (e.g. “I think that most other students probably 
also showed up late for Jason’s experimental session”).  This measure was included to ascertain 
whether the effect of fine frame in our field experiment might, alternatively, have been 
attributable to participants having had a perception that late arrival would be more normative 
when the fine was framed in a compensatory (verses retributive) way, rather than the more 
specific mechanism of moral construal of the target behavior. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire participants were fully debriefed as to the aims of the study and were given a small 
confectionary item to thank them for their time.  
Results 
We conducted two one-way ANOVAs with fine frame as the independent variable in 
both cases and perceived moral transgression and perceived norm of lateness as the dependent 
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variables in respective cases. In both ANOVAs we controlled for the effects of age, gender and 
ethnicity (White British vs. other) by including them as covariates in the analyses.   
Perceptions of moral transgression.  We observed a significant main effect of fine 
frame on participants’ perception of Robin having performed a moral transgression, F(2,83) = 
5.67, p = .005, η2 = .12, which is depicted in Figure 2. Participants were actually most likely to 
perceive Robin’s lateness as a moral transgression when no fine was attached to late coming (M 
= 4.64, SD = .89), a point to which we will return in our discussion. Although perceptions of 
moral transgression in the retributive condition were slightly lower (M = 4.28, SD = 1.13) than in 
the no fine control, pairwise comparisons revealed this difference to be non-significant (p = .20). 
In line with our hypotheses, however, perceptions of moral transgression in the compensatory 
condition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.28) were, significantly lower than both the no fine control (p = 
.001), and the retributive condition (p = .04).  
Perceived norms of lateness. In general, participants indicated that they would not 
expect lateness to the experiment in question to be particularly normative, with overall mean 
scores being 2.77 (SD = 1.24) on the 7-point scale. These perceptions were almost completely 
unaffected by the fine frame, with virtually no effect at all of fine frame being observed on 
perceived norms of lateness, F(2,83) = 0.02, p = .97, η2 =.001. 
Discussion 
The findings of this scenario study support our theoretical claim that retributively-framed 
financial deterrents encouraged cooperative behavior more effectively in Study 1 because they 
frame defection behavior as more of a moral transgression. In line with our theoretical 
predictions, participants in this study were less likely to perceive the target individual’s late 
arrival to the hypothetical experiment as a moral transgression when a fine was framed in a 
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compensatory way, than when that same fine was framed retributively, or when no fine was 
present. Conversely, perceptions of moral transgression in the face of a retributively worded fine 
did not differ significantly from the no-fine control. Furthermore, these effects of fine frame did 
not extend to more general perceptions of how likely people in general would be to cooperate in 
the face of the fine. Rather, the compensatory frame seemed to more specifically undermine the 
extent to which defection was seen as a moral transgression.  
General Discussion 
The question of when and why the introduction of a financial deterrent might lead to either 
positive or negative effects on the targeted behavior has been a topic of theoretical debate within 
both social psychology and behavioral economics. Our field experiment (Study 1) provides the 
first direct empirical demonstration that materially-identical deterrents can have markedly 
different effects on real, observed, behavior as a function of whether the deterrent is framed in 
terms of it compensating for the offenders’ wrong-doing or retributively punishing their violation 
of social or moral standards. Our findings show that participants who were presented with a late 
fine framed in retributive terms were twice as likely to arrive on time, and arrived significantly 
earlier than those who were not threatened with any form of fine. However, when exactly the 
same £2 fine was presented to participants in a way that suggested its payment might serve to 
compensate for the wrong-doing, this fine led to virtually no impact on participants’ behavior 
whatsoever. In fact, levels of punctuality in response to this fine were indistinguishable from the 
no fine control. In our second study we provided evidence (via a scenario methodology) that this 
difference in effect of the compensatory and retributively worded fines was indeed potentially 
attributable to their differential capacity to construe the behavior in question in moral terms. We 
showed in Study 2 that when participants were presented with a scenario in which a target 
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arrived late in the face of a either a compensatory fine, a retributive fine or no fine at all they 
were less likely to morally judge this lateness when the fine was framed as compensation 
(relative to both a retributive fine and no fine). 
A Material Promotion-Moral Prevention (MPMP) theory of financial deterrents 
The one sense in which the results of our scenario study might initially appear to differ 
slightly from those observed in the field study relates to the positioning of the moral judgment 
results for the no fine control relative to the two fine frame conditions. To recap, in our field 
experiment we observed an enhancement of punctuality in the retributive condition relative to 
the no fine control, rather than an undermining of punctuality (relative to control) in the 
compensatory condition. In our scenario study, in contrast, the compensatory condition did 
appear to undermine ascribed morality (relative to control), with the retributive frame being 
similar to the control in this case. Indeed the scenario condition in which there appeared the most 
ascription of moral transgression to the target for being late was when lateness came with no 
potential fine attached to it. Although these observations of retributive frames enhancing co-
operation in Study 1 and compensatory frames undermining morality in Study 2 may at first 
glance seem slightly discordant, upon further theoretical reflection this is perhaps less the case. It 
actually makes sense that participants might morally judge a target more for being late when this 
lateness came with no potential punishment attached that might help 'make up for’ for 
transgression. In a sense, Robin was seen as doing something bad and ‘getting away with it’, 
hence our participants in the no fine condition subsequently judged him maximally harshly on 
the moral dimension. What this suggests is that all fines may perhaps be perceived to be at least 
slightly compensatory in terms of how we subsequently morally judge those who transgress 
(including ourselves), with judgment being dealt out in particularly sharp measure when one (as 
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the saying goes) ‘gets away with murder’.  However, in relation to the behavioral decisions of 
those choosing to cooperate or defect in the face of such fines, there is obviously a counter-
veiling, materially driven, effect that motivates people to avoid the material cost of having to pay 
the fine. In short, fines potentially provide a material incentive that promotes cooperation, but a 
moral disincentive (or license to defect) that can prevent the fine from increasing cooperation.  
When conceptualizing fines in this way, the results of our two studies are actually 
rendered highly theoretically concordant. Participants in our field study had a material incentive 
to plan to be punctual (i.e. not risking the loss of £2). When this fine was framed retributively, 
the counter-veiling moral disincentive (license) that the presence of such a fine presented was 
drastically reduced because there was little sense in which paying the fine was construed as 
making up for this lateness. Thus, the retributive condition led to a promotion of punctuality 
relative to when no fine was used. In the compensatory condition, the same material incentive to 
be punctual was still present; however the moral licensing of lateness provided by the 
compensatory fine offset this in a way that prevented an increase in co-operation. Thus, these 
two counter-veiling forces cancelled one another out such that the effect of the compensatory 
fine was indistinguishable from the no fine control. In the scenario study, however, no material 
incentives were present for our research participants in any of our conditions. In effect, that study 
was only tapping into the morality side of our proposed material promotion-moral prevention 
(MPMP) model. It therefore makes sense that, in this case, we would simply see an undermining 
of the level of moral judgment applied to the act of defection (i.e. lateness) in the compensatory 
condition relative to a no fine control, with this being far less the case when the fine was framed 
retributively.    
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Our proposed MPMP model also offers a potential explanation for the discrepancy in 
direction of effects relative to the control group for our field experiment in comparison to the 
classic Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) childcare center field study. In that original study, a 
(potentially compensatory) fine was shown to actively undermine cooperative behavior relative 
to no fine. A potential explanation posited by our model is that the material incentive for our 
(largely unwaged) undergraduate student research participants of ensuring they did not lose their 
£2 show-up fee may simply have been greater than was the 10-shekel disincentive to avoid 
lateness provided by Gneezy and Rustichini to the (potentially time poor but materially affluent) 
parents in their field study. Thus, the moral license provided by Gneezy and Rustichini’s fine 
may simply not have been as highly offset by a counter-veiling material incentive as was the case 
in our study. This would explain the actual reduction of co-operation when the (potentially 
compensatory) fine was present in their study as compared to the mere failure of our 
compensatory fine to produce any increase in co-operation. 
In addition to demonstrating the importance of how financial deterrents are framed, our 
findings also empirically demonstrate, for the first time in a field setting, the greater impacts of 
financial disincentives implemented in a public rather than private context. We show that only 
the threat of a publicly administered fine brought about the desired change in behavior of our 
participants relative to the no fine control condition, further strengthening similar claims recently 
made on the basis of behavior observed in public goods games conducted in the laboratory (Xiao 
& Houser, 2011). Thus, it would appear that the threat of a more publicly extracted fine might 
act as a more powerful incentive for cooperative behavior. Although there exists a range of 
arguments to be had about whether it is ethically appropriate to incorporate more public 
sanctions into the judicial system for more serious offences (Flanders, 2006; Kahan, 1996; 
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Massaro, 1997; Shemtob, 2013; Whitman, 1998), the current findings do at least provide 
evidence that even making the payment of financial disincentives relating to minor incursions 
more public can be effective in amplifying behavioral change. 
The 48% versus 8% difference in rates of late arrival between the private-compensatory 
and public-retributive conditions in our field experiment highlights starkly the practical 
importance for policy makers of considering both a) the extent to which a financial disincentive 
is likely to be perceived as signaling a moral standard rather than as simply a price that one can 
pay for the convenience of defection, and (b) the extent to which the context of a financial 
disincentive’s delivery is public or private in nature. A real world policy context that may be 
informed by these findings is the attempt to tackle global climate change by using financial 
disincentives to discourage people from engaging in activities involving a large carbon footprint. 
An important question becomes whether the effectiveness of simply placing a ‘price’ on carbon 
may be somewhat limited (or even potentially undermined) by the extent to which consumers 
may interpret such measures in a more compensatory way (i.e., “I don’t have to feel bad about 
my high energy consumption because I’ve made up for it by paying the tax”). Moreover, one 
should also consider the extent to which such price-based systems do not make individuals or 
organizations in any way publicly accountable for their carbon-producing actions.  
This study provides an overdue piece of empirical evidence supporting the theoretical 
suggestion (e.g., Fehr & Falk 2002; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Mulder, 2009) that behavioral 
responses to financial disincentives may depend on whether such policies are interpreted as 
signaling moral standards rather than the opportunity to ‘pay for’ negative communal effects of 
one’s actions, which we argue supports our proposed Material Promotion-Moral Prevention 
(MPMP) theory of the effect of financial disincentives on cooperation. Moreover, our findings 
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highlight the benefits of financial disincentives administered in a more public fashion. Both sets 
of findings present important practical considerations for any policy maker seeking to implement 
a system of financial disincentives to encourage more communally beneficial behavior among 
members of a collective. 
 
Notes 
1The no-fine control groups were collected exactly 12 months after the treatment conditions in 
the same weeks of the academic year using entirely equivalent mailing lists (with a new first year 
student cohort). The no-fine and treatment conditions were found to be equivalent on all 
measured demographics (Gender: fine = 63% female, control = 68% female; Mean Age: fine = 
20.26, control = 20.30; Political orientation measured on a 7-point scale from right to left wing: 
fine = 4.00, control = 3.91; Ethnicity: fine = 68% White British, control = 62% White British). 
2 It should be noted, however, that (as would be predicted on the basis of our pilot data reported 
in the method) participants were actually slightly more likely to arrive after 9am when the no 
fine condition contained the retributive wording (46%) than when it contained the compensatory 
wording (35%) and exact mean arrival time was also slightly later in the retributively-worded, no 
fine condition (0.67 minutes before 9am) relative to when the compensatory wording was used 
(1.36 minutes before 9am). 
3 One extreme outlier (> 3 standard deviations earlier than the mean) was removed prior to 
analysis. 
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Table 1 
Percentage of participants arriving late as a function of fine frame and context of 
administration. 
 
 Retributive Frame Compensatory Frame 
Public administration 8.7% 33.3% 
Private administration 30.4% 47.8% 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Mean arrival time in number of minutes prior to requested 9am start, as a function of fine frame 
and context of administration (SDs in parentheses). 
 
 Retributive Frame Compensatory Frame 
Public administration 4.52 (3.24) 2.04 (3.74) 
Private administration 1.38 (4.60) 0.11(4.83) 
 
 
